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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellant/

:
Priority No. 2

v.

:

GLENN EARL LLOYD, II,

i

Defendant/Appellee•

Case No.

960214-CA

:

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
The State appeals from the preliminary hearing court's
dismissal of one count of pattern of unlawful activity, Utah Code
Ann. §§ 76-10-1603 and 76-10-1603.5 (1995); and ten counts of
money laundering, Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1903 (1995).

This Court

has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 77-18a-l(2)(a) (Supp.
1996) and Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2) (e) (Supp. 1996).
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

Did the preliminary hearing court err in concluding

that there was insufficient evidence of an "enterprise"to bind
defendant over on a charge of pattern of unlawful conduct?
2.

Did the preliminary hearing court err in concluding

that there was insufficient evidence of defendant's intent to
conceal the proceeds to bind defendant over on ten charges of
money laundering?

•

*

*

In reviewing a dismissal for insufficient evidence, the
appellate court must view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the losing party and, when so viewed, determine if
there is a reasonable basis in the evidence to support a prima
facie case.

If so, the dismissal must be reversed.

Highland

Const. Co. v. Union Pacific R. Co.. 683 P.2d 1042, 1045 (Utah
1984); Management Committee. etc. v. Graystone Pines. 652 P.2d
896, 898 (Utah 1982).

See State v. Pledger. 896 P.2d 1226, 1230

(Utah 1995) (upholding bind over "because we cannot say that "the
evidence is wholly lacking and incapable of reasonable inference
to prove some issue which supports the [prosecution's]
claim[.]").

See also State v. Jaeger. 896 P.2d 42 (Utah App.

1995) ("the ultimate decision of whether to bind a defendant over
for trial presents a question of law" which is reviewed "de novo
without deference").
These issues are preserved in the record (see R. 363390, 423-433, 1251-1263, 1276-1284).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
All pertinent constitutional provisions, statutes and
rules are contained in addendum B.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged in a multiple count information
with 14 felony counts of securities fraud in violation of Utah
2

Code Ann. §§ 61-1-1 and 61-1-21 (1995 and Supp. 1996); 10 felony
counts of offering unregistered securities in violation of Utah
Code Ann. §§ 61-1-7 and 61-1-21 (1995 and Supp. 1996); 1 second
degree felony count of pattern of unlawful activity in violation
of Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-10-1603 and 76-10-1603.5 (1995); and 10
second degree felony counts of money laundering, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1903 (1995) (R. 307-332).

Following a

preliminary hearing held on November 13-16, 1995, defendant was
bound over for trial on all (counts 1-24) but the pattern of
unlawful activity (count 25) and money laundering charges (counts
26-35) (R. 457-466) (a copy of the trial court's written Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order is contained in Addendum
A).

The State appeals the order dismissing these charges.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1
In the mid to late 1980's and continuing up until the

filing of the instant charges, on November 13, 1995, defendant
networked social and professional acquaintances to gain
introductions to several Utah doctors (see, e.g.. R. 307, 836-38,
856-57, 902, 923-24, 1008, 1061, 1195).

1

Defendant represented

The State's recitation of events underlying the charges
is derived from evidence presented at the preliminary hearing and
is set forth in the light most favorable to the State, including
all reasonable inferences therefrom. See State v. Pledger. 896
P.2d 1226 (Utah 1995) (directing magistrates to view preliminary
hearing evidence in light most favorable to prosecution and
resolve all inferences in the prosecution's favor).
3

himself as a financial advisor and offered to assist the doctors
with financial advice regarding both their individual and/or
office pension plans as well as their personal investment goals
(see, e.g.. R. 836-38, 857, 898, 902-03, 924, 953, 977, 1009,
1061, 1095).

Defendant initially purported to represent the

investment firms Coordinated Financial Services and/or Richards
Investments (R. 923, 953, 978, 1009, 1062), stating that he was
part of an investment organization with offices in New York City,
New York, and Salt Lake City, Utah (Id.).

In describing his

investment group, defendant suggested to at least one doctor that
"there were several people7' in the group, "on [the] due diligence
committee that looked at different projects to see if they were
viable to invest in[.]" (R. 978). By the early 1990s, defendant
had established his own investment advisor business, Applied
Financial Concepts (see, e.g.. R. 897, 1025, 1062).

He

continued, however, to offer securities through Richards
Investments (Supp. R. 1621, Exh. #71).
Typically, defendant met with the doctors one on one
(see, e.g.. R. 816-17, 821, 1063), to discuss their individual
pension plans and to suggest various u low risk investment
opportunities" in approximately ten different companies (see.
e.g.. R. 820, 823, 833, 863, 872, 882, 954). Defendant promised
the doctors that they would receive interest payments on their
investments ranging anywhere from 8% to 15% (see, e.g.. R. 9054

06, 982, 1049), and that at the end of a specified period, the
doctors' principal investment would be returned in full (see,
e.g., R. 824, 846, 861, 906, 999, 1003-04, 1052, 1065, 1081,
1197-98).

Defendant assured the doctors that their investments

were "secured" by liens on the capital owned by the individual
companies (see, e.g.. R. 820, 863, 872, 913, 1024, 1065, 1076,
1196).
In addition to these assurances, defendant encouraged
hesitant doctors to invest by stressing that his own investment
advisor business, Applied Financial Concepts, was also investing
in a particular company (see, e.g., R. 891, 897, 1015, 1025,
1052).

As a consequence, the doctors believed that defendant was

acting solely as an agent seeking investors and that he had no
personal interest in the various offered businesses (see, e.g.,
R. 93 9, 961, 991). The doctors were further led to believe that
defendant would receive his compensation in fees and percentages
from the companies he purported to represent (see, e.g., R. 862,
872, 983, 1201).
Based on defendant's representations and assurances,
each of the nine doctors agreed to invest in at least one of the
companies defendant offered (see, e.g.. R. 815-817, 830-31, 858,
868, 874, 877, 904, 928, 978, 989, 1017-18, 1064, 1068, 1075,
1077, 1145, Supp. R. 1433-1523, 1525-1540, Exh. ## 53A-59A, 61A63A).

Each doctor choosing to invest in a particular company
5

personally handed defendant a check made out to that business in
amounts varying from between $10,000 and $150,000 (Id.).
Significantly, defendant never informed any doctor that
he had been enjoined by the United States Department of Labor
from "acting in any fiduciary capacity and from providing
investment advice" for a ten year period beginning May 29, 1990
(see, e.g., R. 826, 848, 908, 939, 985, 1000-02, 1028, 1086,
1204).

Nor did he inform any doctor that his Idaho securities

license had been revoked (see, e.g.. R. 882, 1030, 1086).
Although several doctors received minimal returns on
their investment, the returns were in the form of cashiers'
checks drawn on a bank, rather than from any particular company
in which the doctor had invested (R. 907, 941, 983, 992, 105455).

These payments did not continue, nor did any doctor recover

his full investment at the end of the specified period (Id.).
State's investigator Verdi White looked into
allegations of defendant's involvement in securities fraud and
money laundering (R. 1119).

In so doing, White uncovered nine

checking accounts at several Utah banks wherein defendant
deposited the doctors' monies. Although defendant owned and
controlled these accounts, they were named after the registered
and unregistered businesses for which defendant had purported to
solicit the doctors' investments including Sourceline Capital,
A.F.C., A.F.C. Inter-cap, Internal Capitalization Partnership,
6

C.C. Management, F.C. Finance, F.C. Leasing, Peak Strategy
Management, and Tempus Utile (R. 1109-1186, 1223-1235).2 White
did not determine whether any of these checking accounts were
interest bearing accounts and did not view that information as
critical to his investigation (R. 1155-56).

Rather, White

tracked the doctors' monies into and out of

the various

defendant controlled accounts, including defendant's personal
withdrawals and transfers between accounts.3 White also
investigated whether there was any ongoing business and/or
company associated with any of
(R. 1156, 1162).

the account names and found none

Although one of the account names was also a

limited corporation, White found no indication of an ongoing
business related to that account.

White concluded that the

accounts were merely shell accounts (R. 1183-85).

2

Defendant also deposited one doctor's money into an
account, Cross Country Management, over which he did not have
signatory authority (R. 1157) .
3

To assist the preliminary hearing court in keeping
track of the multiple transactions investigated, White had a
chart and spreadsheet prepared for each account depicting the
amounts of and dates on which the victims' checks were deposited,
as well as the amounts of and dates on which defendant made
subsequent withdrawals from and/or transfers between the suspect
accounts (R. 1121-22; Supp. R. 1433-1540, Exh. ## 53-59A, 6163A). The charts were not intended to reflect a complete
representation of the activity in each individual account, but
rather to focus on those transactions involving the doctors'
monies (R. 1138). The State's recitation of the evidence
supporting the information highlights those transactions
emphasized in the preliminary hearing and does not attempt to
detail every transaction otherwise set forth in the spreadsheets.
7

Defendant never informed the doctors that their money
would be deposited into these accounts and/or transferred to and
commingled with funds in other defendant controlled accounts (see
e.g.. R. 873, 875, 881, 883-84, 888-89, 909, 919, 940-41, 1029,
1077, 1079-80, 1100-03, 1204-06, 1211).
The transactions in each account pertinent to the
charges of pattern of unlawful conduct and money laundering are
set forth below.
Sourceline

Capital.

Defendant maintained sole

signatory authority for this First Security Bank Account (FSB)
(R. 1124-25).

Although defendant registered the Sourceline

Capital name for business purposes, listing himself and Jerry
Sheets as the owners (R. 1124-25; Supp. R. 1327-1329, Exh. #5),
White found no evidence of an ongoing business operating under
that name (R. 1124-25, 1133) .4
Deposits.

In May 1993, defendant opened this account

by depositing a $10,000 check solicited from Dr. Sheffield (Supp.
R. 1367-1368, 1524-1526, Exh. ## 23, 61-61A).

Later this same

month, defendant, transferred $1,500 from his financial advisor

Defendant maintained another Sourceline account at
Draper Bank from which funds were transferred to the F.C. Finance
account discussed at p. 10, infra (see Supp. R. 1448, Exh. # 56).
Because no victims' proceeds were directly deposited into this
second Sourceline account, no chart and spreadsheet for the
account were introduced at the preliminary hearing.
8

business account, Applied Financial Concepts (Supp. R. 1524-1526,
Exh. ## 61-61A).5
Withdrawals/Transfers.

Following these deposits and

prior to March 1994, defendant personally withdrew $8,873 from
the account and caused a $1,300 check to be issued to his wife,
Julie Lloyd (R. 1126-27; Supp. R. 1524-1526, Exh. ##61-61A).
Defendant also transferred $1,525 to the Applied Financial
Concepts account (Id.)
F.C. Finance.

This FSB account was solely owned and

controlled by defendant (R. 1137).

Defendant registered the F.C.

Finance name for business purposes, but White found no other
evidence of an ongoing business (R. 1138, 1143) .
Deposits.

Defendant opened the account in March 1990

when he deposited the first of many checks solicited from Dr.
Nelson; the chart and spreadsheet prepared for the F.C. Finance
account reflect that from approximately March 1990 to July 1992,
defendant deposited $40,394 of Dr. Nelson's money into the
account (Supp. R. 1448-1473, Exh. ## 56-56A).

Additionally,

during March 1990 to March 1994, defendant transferred funds from
his other accounts including F.C. Leasing ($24,777), Peak

5

Although the charts and spreadsheets admitted below
reflect a number of transfers to and from the Applied Financial
Concepts account to defendant's other accounts, no victims' check
were directly deposited into the Applied Financial Concepts
account, thus, the specific chart and spreadsheet for this
account were not introduced into evidence.
9

Strategy ($45,563), Sourceline Capital (FSB) ($1,838), C.C.
Management ($25,000) (Id.). and a second F.C. Finance account
which defendant maintained at West One Bank (WOB) ($3,750) (Id.) .6
Withdrawals/Transfers.

Following the deposit of Dr.

Nelson's first check on March 13, 1990, and up until March 1994,
defendant personally withdrew approximately $2 9,245 from the F.C.
Finance account (Id.).

Further, defendant transferred proceeds

from this account to his other controlled accounts including
Tempus Utile ($2,000), and F.C. Leasing ($4,331), Internal
Capitalization Partnership ($1,000), and the WOB F.C. Finance
account ($9,165).

Checks were also drawn on the account and

issued to defendant's business account, Applied Financial
Concepts ($1,000), and to his wife ($ 7,050) (Id.).
F.C.

Leasing.

Defendant maintained sole signatory

authority over this FSB account (R. 1144).

While defendant

registered the F.C. Leasing name for business purposes, White
found no indication that F.C. Leasing was an ongoing company (R.
1144) .
Deposits.

The chart and spreadsheet for this account

reveal that from approximately December 1991 to May 1993,

Defendant transferred an additional $19,000 from a
second Sourceline account maintained at the Draper Bank (Supp. R.
1448, Exh. # 56). See supra note 4. The chart and spreadsheet
for this second Sourceline account, as well as the second F.C.
Leasing account maintained at WOB were not introduced below.
10

defendant deposited proceeds from doctors Ellingson ($20,000),
Rappleye ($29,250), Gruwell ($40,975), Bennett ($20,000), Nelson
($79,230), Gadd ($15,000), Robinson ($10,000) and Saunders
($25,000) (Supp. R. 1474-1509, Exh. ## 57-57A) . Additionally,
from approximately January 1990 to May 1993, defendant
transferred funds into this account from his financial advisor
business account, Applied Financial Concepts, ($28.28), and his
other accounts' including International Capitalization ($1,000),
F.C. Finance ($7,356), and Tempus Utile ($6,216) (Id.).
Withdrawals/Transfers.

From approximately January 1990

to June 1994, defendant personally withdrew approximately $57,337
from the account, and caused additional checks to be issued to
his wife ($6,100), and to his investment business account,
Applied Financial Concepts ($13,000) (Id.).

Defendant also

transferred funds to his other solely controlled accounts
including Tempus Utile ($2,500), F.C. Finance ($33,102), and
Sourceline Capital ($33,325) (Id.).
Tempus Utile.

Defendant was the sole signatory on this

First Interstate Bank account (R. 1165).

The Tempus Utile name

was also registered as a limited liability company listing
defendant, Wayne King, Colleen King and Pat Murphy as its
managers (Id.).
Deposits.

Defendant deposited a $15,000 check

solicited from Dr. Bennett on February 6, 1992.
11

Prior to the

Nelson deposit, the account had a balance of $129.26 (Supp. R.
1527, 1532, Exh. ## 62-62A).

The chart and spreadsheet for this

account further indicate that up until approximately September
1992, defendant deposited additional checks solicited from
doctors Nelson ($10,000), Saunders ($25,000), Gruwell ($10,000),
Gadd ($10,000) and Rappleye ($10,000) (Id.).

Defendant also

transferred funds to this account from other accounts including
F.C. Finance ($2,000), F.C. Leasing ($2,500) and his investment
business account ($10,000) (Id.).
Withdrawals/Transfers.

Defendant made personal

withdrawals from the account ($8,048) and also transferred money
to his other accounts' including F.C. Finance ($2,000), F.C.
Leasing ($2,500), and Sourceline Capital ($10,000) (Id.).
A.F.C.

Defendant had sole signatory authority this FSB

account (R. 1147).

A.F.C. was not a registered business name

(Supp. R. 1335-1339, Exh. #8), nor did White find any other
evidence of an ongoing company under this acronym (R. 114 9).

The

account was separate from defendant's business account, Applied
Financial Concepts, which name was registered for business
purposes (R. 114 9).
Deposits.

Defendant opened this account with a $100

deposit on December 3, 1990. Thereafter, between December 3,
1990 and December 6, 1990, defendant deposited checks solicited
from Dr. Rappleye ($10,000) (Supp. R. 1541-1598, Exh. # 68
12

(Rappleye Deposition, see Supp. R. 1599, Exh. # 1, attached
thereto)), Dr. Gruwell ($10,000) (Supp. R. 1373-1374, Exh. #26),
and Dr. Nelson ($10,000) (Supp. R. 1393-1394, Exh. #36) (see R.
1148; Supp. R. 1432-1433, Exh. ## 53-53A).

He also deposited a

$10,000, from an unknown source (Supp. R. 1433, Exh. # 53A).
Withdrawals/Transfers.

By December 7, 1990, defendant

had personally withdrawn all but the initial $100 deposit from
this account (Id.).
Peak Strategy

Management.

Defendant maintained sole

signatory authority for this FSB account

(R. 1153).

Peak

Strategy Management was not a registered business name, nor did
White find any other evidence of an ongoing business (R. 1153).
Deposits.

Defendant opened the account in October 1993

by depositing a $25,000 check solicited from Dr. Nelson (Supp. R.
1521, Exh. ## 59A). Thereafter, from approximately October 1993
to March 1994, defendant deposited additional monies solicited
from Dr. Nelson ($45,000), as well as Dr. Bennett ($20,625)
(Supp. R. 1409-1412, 1520-1523, Exh. ## 42, 59-59A).
Withdrawals/Transfers.

defendant

During this same period

made personal withdrawals ($5,000) and transferred

funds to his other accounts including F.C. Finance ($45,563), and
Applied Financial Concepts ($5,125) (Id.).
Cross

Country

Management.

This Bank One account was

the only account not solely owned and controlled by defendant;
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rather, the account signatories were listed as Ed Parker and
Myron Abbott (R. 1157) . However, defendant opened the account on
July 20, 1993, depositing a $25,000 check from Dr. Nelson (Supp.
R. 1533-1540, Exh. ## 63-63A).

Seven days later, on July 27,

1993, Abbott issued a check for $25,000 to F.C. Finance, an
account over which defendant did maintain sole control (Id.).
There were no other deposits to the account between July 20, 1990
and July 27, 1990 (Id.).
Similarly, defendant deposited a $10,000 check from Dr.
Bennett on August 12, 1993 (Supp. R. 1533-1540, Exh. ## 63-63A).
Prior to this deposit, the account balance was $51.63 (Id.).

One

day later, on August 13, 1993, an entity known as G&H Market
deposited $1,350 into the Cross Country Management account (Id.).
Three days later after G&H Market deposit, on August 16, 1993,
$10,000 was transferred from the Cross Country Management account
to the defendant-controlled FC Finance account, leaving a balance
of $1,401.63 in the Cross Country Management account (Id.).
A.F.C. Inter-cap.

Defendant maintained sole signatory

authority for this Zions National Bank (ZNB) account (R. 1159).
The A.F.C. Inter-cap name was not registered for business
purposes, nor did White find any other indication of an ongoing
company (R. 1161).
Deposits.

The chart and spreadsheet for this account

indicate that defendant opened it on December 26, 1991 with a
14

$20,000 check received from Dr. Bennett (Supp. R. 1434-1440, Exh.
##. 54-54A).

On July 1, 1992, defendant deposited a $15,000

check received from Dr. Saunders (Id.).

From the opening date of

the account up until January 1993, defendant also transferred
additional funds to the account from the Internal Capitalization
Partnership ($6,799) and Sourceline Capital ($925) accounts

(ULJ •
Withdrawals/Transfers.

Additionally, over this same

period, defendant personally withdrew $1,500 from the account,
and transferred funds to his other accounts including F.C.
Leasing ($2,062) and Sourceline Capital ($21,137) (JJJL.) .
C.C. Management.

Defendant maintained sole signatory

authority for this FSB account (R. 1168).

C.C. Management was

not registered as a business name and White found no indication
that it is an otherwise ongoing company (Id.).
Deposits.

Defendant opened the account on October 25,

1993, depositing a $25,000 check solicited from Dr. Nelson (R.
1168-69; Supp. R. 1441-1447, Exh. ## 55-55A) . Over the next
eight month period until May 1994, defendant deposited an
additional $65,000 of Dr. Nelson's money into the account (Id.),
Withdrawals/Transfers.

During this same period,

defendant withdrew funds from the C.C. Management account on his
own behalf ($31,000), and on behalf of his wife ($2,000) (Exh. ##
55-55A).

He also transferred funds to his business account,
15

Applied Financial Concepts ($8,000), and to his other controlled
accounts including F.C. Finance ($45,000) and Peak Strategy
($20,000) (IJLJ •
Internal Capitalization Partnership.
sole signatory for this FSB account (R. 1170).

Defendant was the
The name was not

registered for business purposes, nor did White find any other
indication of an ongoing company known as Internal Capitalization
Partnership (Id.).
Deposits.

The chart and spreadsheet for this account

indicate that a $15,000 check solicited from Dr. Gruwell was the
opening deposit for this account (Supp. R. 1510-1519, Exh. ## 5858A).

From approximately December 1989 to November 1991,

defendant deposited an additional $15,000 of Dr. Gruwell's money,
as well as checks solicited from doctors Nelson ($75,000),
Bennett ($15,000), Gadd ($15,000), and Rappleye ($30,000) (Id.).
He also transferred funds to the account from his F.C. Finance
account ($1,000) (Id.).
Withdrawals/Transfers.

From approximately January

1990 to December 1991, defendant transferred funds from this
account to his investment business account ($4,800), and to his
other accounts including A.F.C. Inter-cap ($6,799), and F.C.
Leasing ($1,000) (Id.).
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Ruling.

At the conclusion of the preliminary hearing,

the magistrate made the following uncontroverted factual findings:
a.

During all times relevant to the charges presented
(1991 through 1994), defendant maintained an
investment advisor business entitled Applied
Financial Concepts through which he gave
investment advice, assisted individuals in
investing their money and transferred individuals'
money to various investments,

b.

The defendant represented himself as an
investment advisor to [doctors Bennett,
Sheffield, Ellingson, Gruwell, Saunders,
Nelson, Robinson, Gadd and Rappleye].

c.

In his capacity as an investment advisor,
defendant personally met with each of the
above-referenced individuals to discuss
investing in one or more of the following
companies: FC Leasing, CC Management, Cross
Country Management, Peak Strategy Management,
Sourceline Capital, AFC Inter-Cap, Internal
Capitalization Partnership, Tempus Utile, FC
Finance, and AFC.

d.

In each meeting, defendant described [these]
companies as existing, viable companies doing
business in the State of Utah.

e.

The defendant told each physician that his
investments were low risk and that his
principal would be returned in a period of
one to three years and during that time
period, the physicians would receive monthly
or quarterly interest payments, ranging from
eight to fourteen percent.

f.

After the physicians were offered the
securities, the physicians agreed to invest
in the described business and, in each
instance physically handed the defendant a
check issued to the specific business in
which they had decided to invest.

g.

The defendant opened the following checking
accounts through the use of registered and
17

unregistered dbas: Sourceline Capital
(Draper Bank) ("Draper") #91-02679-9, FC
Finance (First Security Bank ("FSB") #21626776-10)), FC Leasing (FSB #216-25076-16),
AFC (FSB #216-26091-15), Peak Strategy
Management (FSB #216-1019290), (Cross Country
Management (Bank One #1162-8004), AFC InterCap (Zions Bank #015-352206), Tempus Utile
(First Interstate Bank #26-03050-2), CC
Management (FSB #216-10192-82), and Internal
Capitalization Management (FSB #216-0022915). The defendant was the sole signatory on
these accounts and defendant was the only
person who deposited or withdrew money out of
these accounts.
There were two Sourceline Capital accounts,
one at Draper Bank and one at First Security
Bank. The Sourceline Capital account at
Draper Bank listed Jerry Sheets as a
signatory and is not relevant to the State's
money laundering charge. However, the First
Security Bank Sourceline Capital account (FSB
#216-00015-88) was established by the
defendant and he was the sole signatory.
After the defendant personally received the
victims' checks, he deposited the checks into
[these]accounts which he owned and
controlled. These accounts bore the name of
the security offered the victim so the money
could be deposited into that account.7
Cross Country Management at Bank One listed
Myron Lee Abbott and Edward C. Parker as
signatories. However, Dr. Nelson's $25,000
was the opening deposit in that account on
July 20, 1993. On that same day, $10,000
cash was also placed in the account. On July
27, 1993, Myron Abbott issued a check for
$15,000 from the Cross Country account to FC
Finance, an account over which the defendant
7

The trial
money went to which
duplicated here(see
magistrate's ruling

court also made findings as to which victims
defendant controlled account, which are not
R. 461-62, a complete copy of the
is contained in addendum A ) .
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had sole control. Other than these three
transactions, no other money went in or out
of the Cross Country Management account
during the week of July 20-27, 1993. Within
one week, the defendant gained control over
Dr. Nelson's $25,000, which Dr. Nelson was
told would be invested in a business entitled
Cross Country Management.
At all times relevant hereto, the defendant
told the victims that their proceeds were
invested in the existing, viable Utah
companies which he initially offered them and
that the proceeds were not in his control.
Defendant refused to answer the physicians'
questions regarding the proceeds' location,
nature and control.
Each time a victim actually received an
alleged interest payment on his investment,
he would receive it in the form of a
cashier's check drawn on a bank and not from
the alleged investment entity or even the
defendant-controlled account by the same
name.
After the physicians' funds were deposited
into one or more of the defendant-controlled
accounts, the spreadsheets (Exh. ##53A-59A,
61A-63A) established that the following
relevant activity occurred: 1) Funds would
be withdrawn and deposited in the various
defendant-controlled accounts; 2) Funds would
be withdrawn from the defendant-controlled
accounts and deposited into one or more of
the defendant's personal accounts; 3) Funds
would be withdrawn from the defendantcontrolled accounts and transferred to other
entities not controlled by the defendant; or
4) Funds would be deposited into the
defendant-controlled accounts from other
entities not controlled by the defendant.
The spreadsheets from each defendantcontrolled account (Exh. ## 53A-59A, 61A-63A)
established and explained the deposit and
withdrawal activity which occurred
specifically between the ten defendant19

controlled accounts as well as the
defendant's personal checking accounts.
However, the State presented no testimony
explaining the withdrawal and deposit
activity in the defendant-controlled accounts
relating to entities not controlled or
established by the defendant such as Star
King, Adalyn Financial, Capstone and Towers,
among others.

P-

Furthermore, the State's witness which
testified as to the above-described accounts
could not tell the Court whether these
defendant-controlled accounts were interest
bearing.
During the time defendant was transferring
these funds between his accounts and to
himself, he continued to maintain his
investment advisor company, Applied Financial
Concepts, and continued to represent himself
as an investment advisor.

(R. 459-464, see addendum A ) .
Based on these findings, the magistrate concluded that
there was probable cause to bind defendant over on twenty four
counts of securities act violations and that the securities act
violations also established the pattern element of the pattern of
unlawful activity charge (R. 464, see addendum A ) .

Although the

magistrate found sufficient evidence to establish the pattern
element, the magistrate concluded that there was no probable
cause to suggest "that defendant's use of his investment advisor
business, Applied Financial Concepts and his use of various licit
and illicit dbas in establishing the checking accounts wherein he
deposited the physicians' checks demonstrated the existence of an
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enterprise" (R. 465, see addendum A).

Rather, the magistrate

concluded "that the evidence used to establish the existence of
the investment advisor company as well as the various dbas [was]
evidence which only further established and prove[d] the elements
of the pattern (the securities fraud and the sale of unregistered
securities), and not the existence of an enterprise" (Id.).
Finally, referring to the ten money laundering counts, the
magistrate concluded "that there [was] no probable cause to
establish that the defendant intentionally concealed the proceeds
since no evidence was presented to answer [its] questions as to
the various transactions which transpired between the defendantcontrolled accounts and other entities after the deposits of the
physicians' proceeds into the defendant-controlled accounts"
(JJL.) •

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Point I.

This is an appeal from the magistrate's

refusal to bind over one charge of pattern of unlawful activity
and ten charges of money laundering.

Concerning the pattern of

unlawful activity charge, the magistrate correctly concluded that
defendant's 24 securities act violations (for which he was bound
over) constituted the pattern element of this offense. However,
the magistrate erred as a matter of law when it failed to
conclude that defendant's investment advisor business, Applied
Financial Concepts, and/or defendant's relationship with various
21

registered and unregistered businesses was sufficient to
establish the enterprise element of the offense.

The

magistrate's error was driven by its failure to properly apply
the liberal bind over standard and to fully consider the broad
remedial purposes of Utah's Pattern of Unlawful Activity Act.
POINT II.

Additionally, the magistrate misapplied the

bind over standard and erred as a matter of law when it required
proof concerning the ultimate use of the laundered proceeds in
this case.

Utah's money laundering statute contains no such

requirement.

Rather, the money laundering statute focuses on

transactions designed to conceal the proceeds of illegal
activity.

See Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1903 (1994).

Contrary to

the magistrate's reasoning, disguised and/or concealed bank
deposits like that perpetrated here constitute sufficient proof
of concealment for money laundering purposes.

Moreover, the

State introduced evidence that defendant transferred the proceeds
between his controlled accounts and personally withdrew proceeds
as well.

Such is adequate to establish defendant's ultimate

control over and use of the proceeds for purposes of bind over.
ARSUMENT
POINT I
THE MAGISTRATE ERRED IN FAILING TO RECOGNIZE
THAT DEFENDANT'S INVESTMENT ADVISOR BUSINESS
AND/OR HIS ASSOCIATION-IN-FACT WITH THE
REGISTERED AND UNREGISTERED BUSINESSES HE
PURPORTED TO REPRESENT CONSTITUTED SUFFICIENT
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INDICIA OF AN ENTERPRISE FOR BIND OVER ON A
CHARGE OF PATTERN OF UNLAWFUL ACTIVITY
Defendant is charged with violating Utah's Pattern of
Unlawful Activity Act (UPUA), Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1603 (1995)
(R. 322-23) .8

To convict, the prosecution must establish two

elements, a pattern of racketeering and the existence of an
enterprise.

£££ State v. McGrath. 749 P.2d 631, 636 (Utah 1988)

(requiring proof one element beyond the pattern of racketeering
activity--the existence of an enterprise). Significantly, the
State need not necessarily adduce different proof
these separate elements.

to establish

See United States v. Sanders, 928 F.2d

940, 943 doth cir.) (citing United States? v, TurKette, 452 u.s.
576, 583 (1981) (holding that "proof used to establish these
separate elements may in particular cases coalesce")), cert.
denied. 502 U.S. 845 (1991).
Here, the magistrate correctly concluded that there was
probable cause to establish the pattern element of the UPUA
charge, based on its determination that defendant had committed
24 separate securities act violations (which violations
Defendant is charged under all three UPUA subsections
(R. 322-23). UPUA subsections (1) and (2) prohibit the receipt
and use of proceeds derived from a pattern of unlawful activity
in the acquisition, establishment, or operation of any
enterprise, section 76-10-1603(1), and/or the maintenance of any
interest in or control of any enterprise, section 76-10-1603(2).
The third subsection, section 76-10-1603(3), prohibits a
defendant associated with or employed by an enterprise from
conducting that enterprises affairs through a pattern of unlawful
activity.
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constitute the 24 counts previously bound over for trial in this
matter).

The issue in this appeal is the magistrate's erroneous

further conclusion that the State failed to establish probable
cause for the second UPUA element, the existence of an enterprise
(see R. 464, see addendum A).

Based on this erroneous

conclusion, the magistrate dismissed the UPUA charge.

The

dismissal is inconsistent with the broad remedial purposes
underlying the UPUA statute, as well as the liberal bind over
standard.
A. UPUA Should be Broadly Interpreted
in
Order to Effectuate
its Remedial
Purpose
UPUA was originally enacted in 1981, and was modeled
after the federal Racketeering Influences and Corrupt
Organization Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962-1968.9

This Court has

previously recognized that while RICO and consequently, UPUA
"were intended to apply to persons engaged in acts traditionally
associated with organized crime, a nexus to organized crime was
not included as an element of the offense."

State v. Thompson.

751 P.2d 805, 815 (Utah App. 1988) (citing Sedima. S.P.R.L. v.
Imrez Co.. Inc.. 473 U.S. 479, (1985)), rev'd on other grounds.
810 P.2d 415 (Utah 1991).

Accordingly, UPUA is not limited in

9

In 1987, the Legislature changed the title of § 76-101603 from "Utah Racketeering Influence and Criminal Enterprise
Act" (RICE) to "Utah Pattern of Unlawful Activity" (UPUA).
Because the Act itself remained substantially unchanged, all
references to RICE in case authority have been changed to UPUA.
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application to persons affiliated with organized crime.

Id.

See

also Bradford v. Moench. 670 F.Supp. 920, 928 (D.Utah 1987)
(noting the similarity between UPUA and RICO).

Indeed, the

underlying purpose of racketeering statutes like RICO and UPUA is
to provide new and enhanced penalties and legal remedies for all
types of organized criminal behavior including sophisticated
white-collar schemes like that perpetrated here.

United States

v. Cauble. 706 F.2d 1322, 1330 (5th Cir. 1983), cert, denied. 465
U.S. 1005 (1984).

Therefore, UPUA like its federal counterpart,

should be broadly interpreted in order to effectuate these
remedial purposes. £££ United States v. TurkettS/ 452 U.S. 576,
587 (1981) (Congress directed that RICO statute "be liberally
construed to effectuate its remedial purposes").

The

magistrate's dismissal of the UPUA charge in this case, fails to
recognize these broad remedial goals.
B.

Bind Over Should Occur Unless the Evidence
Is
Wholly Lacking and Incapable of
Reasonable
Inference
to Prove the Charged
Offenses
The dismissal order is also inconsistent with the

liberal bind over standard.

Indeed, the probable cause standard

for criminal bind over is not the equivalent of the reasonable
doubt standard applicable in a criminal trial, nor even the
preponderance standard applicable in civil cases.
Pledger. 896 P.2d 1226, 1229 (Utah 1995).

State v.

Rather, it requires

only wa quantum of evidence sufficient to warrant submission of
25

the case to the trier of fact."

Id. (quoting State v. Anderson.

612 P.2d 778, 783 (Utah 1980)).

Accordingly, the Supreme Court

directs magistrates to view preliminary hearing evidence in the
light most favorable to the prosecution and to resolve all
inferences in the prosecution's favor.
1229.

Pledger, 896 P.2d at

This means that even "close calls" should result in a

determination to bind over for trial.

Id. at 1230.

Indeed, it

is presumed that prosecution evidence will only strengthen by
time of trial.

Id. at 1229 (quoting Diaz v. State, 728 P.2d 503,

510 (Okl.Cr. 1986)).

Therefore, magistrates are directed to bind

criminal defendants over for trial Mu]nless the evidence is
wholly lacking and incapable of reasonable inference to prove
some issue which supports the [prosecution's] claim[.]"

IdT

(quoting Cruz v. Montoya, 660 P.2d 723, 729 (Utah 1983) (setting
out standard for directed verdict in civil case)).
Although the magistrate invoked the probable cause
standard in this case, he failed to properly apply it. While the
magistrate made specific factual findings regarding the existence
of defendant's investment advisor business, and/or his
association with the registered and unregistered businesses he
purported to represent (R. 459-464, see addendum A), the
magistrate failed to draw the further reasonable inferences that
this evidence constituted sufficient indicia of a UPUA enterprise
(Id.).

This failure constitutes error as a matter of law.
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Id.

Accord People v. Lewis. 791 P.2d 1152, 1154 (Colo Ct. App. 1989),
cert, denied, (April 9, 1990) (failure to draw all permissible
inferences and view the evidence in the light most favorable to
the prosecution constitutes error as a matter of law).
C.

Defendant's Sole Proprietorship
Sufficient
Indicia
of a UPUA

Constitutes
Enterprise

Consistent with the remedial aims of

UPUA, an

enterprise is broadly defined as "any individual, sole
proprietorship, partnership, corporation, business trust,
association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of
individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity, and
includes illicit as well as licit entites."
10-1602(1) (1995).

Utah Code Ann. § 76-

Accordingly, the State presented evidence

regarding the probable existence of two alternative enterprises:
1) Defendant's investment advisor business, Applied Financial
Concepts, which is discussed under this heading, and/or 2) an
association-in-fact enterprise consisting of defendant, and the
various registered and unregistered businesses he purported to
represent, which is discussed infra, under heading D (R. 381-82,
424-38) . Significantly, the magistrate found that the investment
advisor business existed and facilitated defendant's securities
fraud scam (R. 459-464, see addendum A ) .

The magistrate also

found that defendant used various registered and unregistered
businesses to establish the bank accounts wherein he deposited
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the proceeds of his securities scam (Id.).

However, the

magistrate ultimately rejected both of the State's enterprise
theories, concluding that there was "no probable cause to suggest
that defendant's use of his investment advisor business, Applied
Financial Concepts, and his use of the various licit and illicit
"dbas" in establishing the checking accounts wherein he deposited
the physicians' checks demonstrated the existence of an
enterprise" (R. 464-65, see addendum A ) .

Rather, the magistrate

concluded that defendant's investment advisor business and/or
association with the various registered and unregistered
businesses simply constituted further evidence in support of the
pattern element (Id.).
Turning to the State's first theory, that defendant's
investment advisor business constituted the UPUA enterprise, the
magistrate's conclusion suggests that defendant cannot be both
the UPUA defendant and the UPUA enterprise.

This conclusion is

inconsistent with the broad UPUA definition of enterprise which
expressly includes "any individual or sole proprietorship."
Section 76-10-1602(1) (emphasis added).

Indeed, the non-

exclusive term "any" reasonably contemplates that both defendant
and non-defendant individuals and/or sole proprietorships may be
named as the UPUA enterprise.

See State v. Bowen. 413 So.2d 798,

799 (Fla. App. 1982) (interpreting similar enterprise definition
and deeming it significant that the legislature could have easily
28

"narrowed" the definition "by supplanting 'any' with 'another'"),
review denied. 424 So.2d 760 (Fla. 1983).
Further, at least one federal district court suggests
that an individual defendant may be Jboth the RICO defendant and
the RICO enterprise under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(a), which corresponds
with UPUA subsection 76-10-1603 (1). See United States v. Pi
Caro. 772 F.2d 1314 (7th Cir. 1985) (suggesting in dicta that an
individual defendant who used income derived from a pattern of
racketeering activity in the operation of an enterprise (himself)
can be both the liable 'person' and the 'enterprise' for purposes
of criminal prosecution under subsection (a) of federal RICO
statute), cert, denied, 475 U.S. 1081 (1986).

See also United

States v. Yonan. 622 F.Supp. 721, 728 (D.C. 111. 1985) ("Congress
could rationally have decided an individual who engages in a
'pattern of racketeering activity' and puts his or her ill-gotten
gains to work in his or her interstate-commerce-affecting
business (a sole proprietorship) should be criminally
responsible" under RICO subsection (a)). The DiCaro and Yonan
courts' suggestions that an individual defendant with a sole
proprietorship may be charged as both the defendant and the
enterprise for purposes of RICO subsection (a), is consistent
with the majority view that a defendant corporation
the RICO defendant and the RICO enterprise.

may be both

See, e.g.. Schofield

v. First Commodity Corp.. 793 F.2d 28, 29-30 (1st Cir. 1986);
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B.F. Hirsch v. Enriaht Refining Co. Inc., 751 F.2d 628, 633 (3rd
Cir. 1984); Busby v. Crown Supply. Inc.. 896 F.2d 833, 841 (4th
Cir. 1990), (overruling United States v. Computer Sciences Corp..
689 F.2d 1181 (4th Cir. 1982), cert, denied. 459 U.S. 1105
(1983)); In re Burzynski. 989 F.2d 733, 743 (5th Cir. 1993);
Haroco. Inc. v. American National Bank and Trust Co.. 747 F.2d
384, 401-02 (7th Cir. 1984), aff'd. 473 U.S. 606 (1985);
Schreiber Distributing Co. v. Sery-Well Furniture Co.. 806 F.2d
1393, 1398 (9th Cir. 1986).
The validity of defendant's dual role under UPUA
subsection (3) is perhaps a closer question.

As a consequence of

the "employed by or associated with" language in the
corresponding RICO subsection (c), the majority of federal courts
have concluded that the individual and/or corporation cannot be
both the defendant and the enterprise when charged thereunder.
See, e.g. Schofield. 793 F.2d at 29 (citing cases); Haroco. 47
F.2d at 400 (noting language in section 1962(c), unlike 1962(a)
and 1962(b), requires "that the liable person be 'employed by or
associated with any enterprise,'" which language "appears to
contemplate a person distinct from the enterprise under section
1962(c)") .10

10

At least one jurisdiction has held otherwise. See
United States v. Hartley. 678 F.2d 961, 986-88 (11th Cir. 1982),
reh'g denied. 698 F.2d 852 (11th Cir. 1982), cert, denied. 459
U.S. 1170 (1983) and 459 U.S. 1183 (1983). In Hartley, the
30

Significantly, in an opinion decided after Haroco, the
Seventh Circuit found a sole proprietorship to be a separate
entity for purposes of a RICO subsection (c) prosecution.
McCullouah v. Suter. 757 F.2d 142 (7th Cir. 1985).

Recognizing

the general rule set forth in Haroco. the Suter court noted that
a sole proprietorship that had no employees or other associates
may not qualify as a separate entity for purposes of RICO
subsection (c). The court further noted, however, that Suter had
several people working for him and this fact made his company a
separate enterprise.

Id. at 144. Additionally, the court noted

that even "if Suter were all by himself and yet adopted the
corporate form for his activity," he might well be properly
prosecuted under subsection (c). Id.

"If the one-man band

incorporates, it gets some legal protections from the corporate
form, such as limited liability; and it is just this sort of
legal shield for illegal activity that RICO tries to pierce."
Id.

The court concluded that with regards to a sole

proprietorship enterprise under subsection (c), the "only
important thing is that it be either formally (as when there is

Eleventh Circuit noted that the "legal existence" of a
corporation satisfies the enterprise element of a RICO charge.
Id. Therefore, because a corporation is separate and distinct
from the pattern element, the Eleventh Circuit held that absent
any express prohibition against the dual role, "[a] corporation
may be simultaneously both a defendant and the enterprise under
RICO," subsection (c). Id.
3X

incorporation) or practically (as when there are other people
besides the proprietor working in the organization) separable
from the individual." JJL_ Accord United States v, Benny, 786
F.2d 1410, 1416 (9th Cir.) (applying Seventh Circuit analysis to
sole proprietor/RICO defendant who either employed or associated
with four other defendants), cert, denied, 479 U.S. 1017 (1986).
At least one state appellate court has analyzed similar
legislation and determined that its state legislature intended
"to direct the thrust of the RICO act against an individual
associating with himself."

Bowen, 413 So.2d at 799. As noted

previously, Florida, like Utah, includes within its definition of
enterprise, "'any' individual or sole proprietorship."

Id.

If

the Florida legislature had not intended to reach individuals
like the sole proprietor/defendant in Bowen, the Florida court
reasoned it could have easily "narrowed" the definition of
enterprise "by supplanting 'any' with 'another.'"

Id.

Consequently, the Bowen court determined that it was not
necessary for Bowen, the sole proprietor of a mini-storage
warehouse, to have associated with a second person or legal
entity in order to be charged under Florida's equivalent to UPUA
subsection (3). Id.

While Bowen apparently had no employees,

unlike the sole proprietors at issue in McCullough and Benny, the
Florida courts interpreting Bowen have determined that the
warehouse constituted a sufficient "de facto entity" with which
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Bowen was deemed to have associated himself.

See State v. Nishi.

521 So.2d 252, 254 (Fla. App.), review denied, 531 S.2d 1355
(Fla. 1988); State v. Wilson, 596 So.2d 775,781 (Fla. App. 1992).
Here, as in Bowen and McCullouah. defendant's
investment advisor business was not formally incorporated;
however, the State presented sufficient evidence to suggest that
it was a separate M e facto" entity for purposes of UPUA
subsection (3). Significantly, the magistrate found that
defendant clearly represented he was soliciting investments
through his investment advisor business (R. 459, see addendum A ) .
This finding is well supported in the record (R. see, e.g.. R.
897, 1025, 1062, 1195)."•

Additionally, evidence adduced below

but not expressly referenced in the magistrate's findings
establishes that defendant assured at least two doctors that his
''company," had performed the "due diligence" on the offered stock
(see, e.g., R. 872, 978). The evidence further establishes that
defendant encouraged hesitant doctors to invest by telling them
that his company was also making a particular investment (see
e.g.. R. 897, 1015, 1025, 1052).

For example, defendant told Dr.

Robinson that because defendant's company, Applied Financial
Concepts, had helped Sourceline Capital to establish in Utah,

11

While no physical evidence was introduced, the State's
investigator testified that the Applied Financial Concepts name
had been registered for business purposes (R. 1149).
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defendant's company and its clients had been given an opportunity
to participate as equity partners in Sourceline Capitals7
business ventures and could expect as much as a 35% return on any
investment (R. 1014-16).
In addition to these verbal representations, the
evidence established that defendant corresponded with doctors
Nelson and Robinson on tangible

Applied Financial Concepts

letterhead (Supp. R. 1416-1417, 1621, Exh. ## 43-44, 71). One of
these letters indicated defendant's continued association with
Richards Investments and was also typed by someone other than
defendant, suggesting that defendant continued to belong to an
investment group and that defendant had at least one employee
(see Exh. # 71) .
Based on the above, the magistrate's finding that the
investment advisor business existed, together with the reasonable
inferences drawn therefrom, provide probable cause for the
existence of a UPUA enterprise.

See Pledger. 896 P.2d at 1230

(directing magistrate's to resolve all inferences in the
prosecution's favor).

Indeed, defendant operated and/or

maintained his investment advisor business for purposes of UPUA
subsections (1) and (2) when he deposited his ill-gotten proceeds
into the defendant-controlled accounts and caused these funds to
be transferred between accounts, including his investment advisor
business account (see R. 463, see addendum A).
34

See Blue Cross

of Western Pennsylvania. 680 F. Supp. 195, 199 (W.D. Pa. 1988)
(finding that same liability analysis applies to both RICO
subsections (a) and (b) on the ground that use of income from
racketeering activity to operate enterprise can also constitute
maintaining one's interest in an enterprise).

Further, applying

McCullouah, Bowen and their progeny, the above evidence also
constitutes sufficient indicia of a defacto entity separate from
defendant and with which he could associate for purposes of
subsection (3). Pledger. 896 P.2d at 1230.
Finally, defendant represented the existence of a
legitimate investment advisor business, suggesting that his
business was involved with an investment group, and likely
employed a secretary.

The broad remedial purposes of the UPUA

statute persuade that defendant should not escape enterprise
liability solely because he was sophisticated enough to avoid
formal incorporation.

See Turkette. 452 U.S. at 591 ("RICO is

equally applicable to a criminal enterprise that has no
legitimate dimension or has yet

to acquire

one.")}

Schofield v.

First Commodity Corp. of Boston. 793 F.2d 28, 32 (1st Cir. 1986)
(reading Turkette "to say that where the language in RICO permits
liability against a culpable entity, courts should find that such
liability exists").
D.

Defendant'a
Association-in-Fact
With the
Registered
and Unregistered
Businesses
He
Purported
to Represent
Constitutes
a UPUA
Enterprise
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Even assuming this Court deems defendant's investment
advisor business insufficient indicia of an enterprise for bind
over under any UPUA subsection, the State presented evidence of
an association-in-fact enterprise between defendant and the
businesses which he used to establish the bank accounts wherein
he deposited the proceeds of his securities scam.

The

magistrate's dismissal of this enterprise theory similarly
constitutes an error of law.

Pledger, 896 P.2d at 1230.

An association-in-fact enterprise uis proved by
evidence of an ongoing organization, formal or informal, and by
evidence that the various associates function as a continuing
unit."

Turkette, 452 U.S. at 583. As noted previously, a UPUA

enterprise includes any union or group of individuals associated
in fact although not a legal entity, and includes illicit as well
as licit entities.

Section 76-10-1602 (1). Here, the magistrate

found that defendant used various registered and unregistered
businesses to establish the disguised checking accounts wherein
he deposited his ill-gotten proceeds (R. 460, see addendum A ) .
However, the magistrate erroneously failed to conclude that
defendant's relationship with these businesses constituted an
association-in-fact enterprise (see R. 464, see addendum A ) .
Instead, the magistrate concluded that defendant's use of the
businesses merely constituted more pattern evidence (Id.).

36

In so

concluding, the magistrate overlooked critical evidence
concerning the nature of the businesses associated with
defendant.
Specifically, at least three of the business were
connected to individuals other than defendant.

As noted

previously, Tempus Utile was a limited corporation involving
three other individuals (R. 1165, Supp. R. 1332-1334, Exh. #7).
Further, the FSB account corresponding to the Sourceline business
was co-owned by defendant and Jerry Sheets (R. 1124-25), and the
Bank One account corresponding to the Cross Country Management
business was co-owned by Ed Parker and Myron Abbott (R. 1157).
The magistrate's failure to give these facts proper
consideration is significant because none of the above
individuals are alleged to have participated in the fraudulent
securities activity for which defendant was previously bound
over.

Therefore, this evidence is not properly viewed as

buttressing the pattern element; rather, it goes to the
establishment of the separate enterprise element.

Indeed, this

evidence establishes that the magistrate erred in concluding that
the defendant-controlled bank accounts were

mere extensions of

defendant and/or his investment advisor business. While
defendant primarily controlled the bank accounts, his connections
to individuals associated with the accounts establishes that he
was not operating as a strictly "one man show."
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Compare Guidry

v. Bank of La Place. 740 F.Supp. 1208, 1212 (E.D. La. 1990)
(holding that bank account in and of itself

was an inanimate

object which could not constitute RICO enterprise), aff'd as
m££i£i£d, 954 F.2d 278 (5th Cir. 1992) with United States v.
Feldman, 853 F.2d 648, 656 (9th Cir. 1988) (rejecting RICO
defendant's claim that he was not sufficiently separable from
businesses he incorporated for purposes of forming an
association-in-fact enterprise therewith, on the ground that the
associated corporations were far from wone-man shows," and were
themselves legal entities), cert, denied, 489 U.S. 1030 (1989).
These overlooked facts are also significant because an
association-in-fact enterprise can consist of both individuals
and corporations.

Accordingly, defendant's relationship with his

Tempus Utile partners alone constitutes an association-in-fact
enterprise.

See Feldman, 853 F.2d at 655-56 (holding that an

association-in-fact enterprise can consist of individuals and
corporations).

The corporate nature of Tempus Utile alone is

also sufficient to establish that enterprise here was separate
from defendant's the pattern of unlawful conduct.

See River City

Markets v. Fleming Foods West, 960 F.2d 1458, 1461 (9th Cir.
1992) (noting that "one can associate with a group of which he is
a member, with the member and the group remaining distinct
entities").

Indeed, other than their connection to the bank

accounts wherein defendant deposited his ill-gotten proceeds,
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defendant's Tempus Utile partners, as well as Sheets, Abbott and
Parker, have no alleged involvement in defendant's pattern of
securities act violations.

See Chang v. Cheng. 80 F.3d 1293,

1300 (9th Cir. 1996) ("the involvement of a corporation, which
has an existence separate from its participation in the
racketeering activity, can satisfy the enterprise element's
requirement of a separate structure"); United States v. Kirk. 844
F.2d 660, 664 (9th Cir.) (holding that where government presented
evidence of several lawful entities existing separately from the
racketeering activities, "the existence of a corporation fulfills
the requirements of an ascertainable structure apart from the
predicate racketeering activity"), cert, denied. 488 U.S. 890
(1988) .
As for the ongoing organization of the association,
that is adequately established by defendant's common control of
the accounts--he was the sole signatory on all but the Cross
Country Management accounts.

Turkette. 452 U.S. at 579 (noting

that "common thread" to association in fact enterprise was
Turkette's "leadership").

Significantly, although defendant did

not own the Cross Country Management account, he made deposits
thereto and corresponding amounts were subsequently transferred
to a defendant-controlled account (R. 1157; Supp. R. 1533-1540,
Exh. ##63-63A).

Thus, the evidence suggests a decision making

mechanism controlled by defendant.
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Sanders. 928 F.2d 940, 943

(finding indicia of an ongoing organization was established with
evidence of a "decision-making framework or mechanism for
controlling the group"); Chang. 80 F.3d at 1299 (holding that
organizational structure of an enterprise "should provide "some
mechanism for controlling and directing the affairs of the group
on an ongoing, rather than an ad hoc, basis'").
Finally, defendant's deposits and transfers between the
accounts also serve to establish the continuity of
association-in-fact enterprise.

the

Indeed, the commingling of the

accounts created a shared financial connection between them.

See

Feldman. 853 F.2d at 647 (deeming shared financial connections
significant to establishment of a continuing enterprise).

These

transactions were multitudinous, not isolated, and are detailed
in the charts and spreadsheets prepared by the State's
investigator (R. 463, see addendum A and Supp. R. 1433-1523,
1525-1540, Exh. ## 53-59A, 61-63A) . See McGrath. 749 P.2d at 637
(deeming it significant that drug trafficking enterprise
conducted more than one "isolated transaction").
When viewed in the light most favorable to the UPUA
charge as Pledger requires, he above facts establish an
association-in-fact enterprise for the purpose of hiding
defendant's securities fraud proceeds.

Defendant's participation

in the enterprise, combined with his acts constituting a pattern
of securities act violations, establish the necessary elements of
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the UPUA charge under all three UPUA subsections.

The

magistrate's failure to so recognize constitutes error as a
matter of law.

Lewis, 791 P.2d at 1154.

POINT II
THE MAGISTRATE ERRED IN FAILING TO RECOGNIZE
THAT DEFENDANT'S CONDUCT IN DEPOSITING THE
PROCEEDS OF HIS SECURITIES FRAUD SCAM INTO
DISGUISED ACCOUNTS, AND/OR HIS COMMINGLING OF
FUNDS IN THESE ACCOUNTS INDICATED AN INTENT
TO CONCEAL THE PROCEEDS UNDER THE MONEY
LAUNDERING STATUTE
A.

Defendant's
Constitute
Laundering

Concealed Bank
Deposits
Sufficient
Evidence of Money
for Bind Over Purposes

The State charged defendant with ten violations of Utah
Code Ann. § 76-10-1903 (1995), which provides in pertinent part
as follows:
(1) A person commits the offense of money
laundering by financial transaction if,
knowing that the property involved in a
financial transaction represents proceeds of
some form of unlawful activity, he conducts
or attempts to conduct a financial
transaction which in fact involves the
proceeds of specified unlawful activity: . .
. (b) knowing that the transaction is
designed in whole or in part to: (i) conceal
or disguise the nature, the location, the
source, the ownership or the control of the
proceeds of specified unlawful activity[.]12

12

The State also charged defendant under subsection
(1)(a)("to promote the unlawful activity"); however, because the
prosecution's argument in the preliminary hearing court was
premised primarily on its theory that defendant intentionally
concealed or disguised the nature, location, source, ownership,
or control of the property, the State makes no argument under
subsection (1)(a) for purposes of this appeal.
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The "specified unlawful activity" pertinent to the
instant case is the 24 securities act violations for which
defendant was bound over for trial (R. 465-65, see addendum A ) .
Additionally, one "conducts" a "transaction" for purposes of the
money laundering statute by making a bank deposit, withdrawal
and/or transfer between bank accounts. Utah Code Ann. § 76-101902 (2), (11) (1995) (£££ addendum B) . Accord United States v.
Garcia-Emanuel. 14 F.3d 1469, 1475-76 (10th Cir. 1994) ( "A
variety of types of evidence" have been found "supportive . . .
of an intent to disguise or conceal" for purposes of the federal
money laundering statute, including "depositing illegal profits
in the bank account of a legitimate business [.]"); United States
v. Reynolds. 64 F.3d 292, 297 (7th Cir. 1995) ("A financial
transaction includes making a deposit into an account [.]"), cert.
denied. 116 S.Ct. 969 (1996).13

Utah's money laundering statute has yet to be
interpreted by its appellate courts. Because the statute
essentially tracks the pertinent language of the federal money
laundering statute, see 18 U.S.C.A. § 1956 (a)(1)(B)(i) (1996)
(prohibiting knowingly conducting a financial transaction
involving the proceeds of specified unlawful activity with the
intent to "conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the
source, the ownership, or the control of the proceeds of
specified unlawful activity"), interpretative federal case law
is persuasive. See, e.g. , State v. Hunt. 781 P.2d 473 (Utah
App. 1989) (applying federal law to the Utah Interception of
Communication Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-23a-l to 77-23a-16 (Supp.
1989), noting that the Utah act was based on Title III of the
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§
2510 to 2520), cert, denied. 789 P.2d 33 (Utah 1990).
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Defendant's conduct in this case plainly fits within
the parameters of the money laundering statute.

The magistrate

expressly found that defendant, upon receiving the victims'
checks, deposited

them into different checking accounts which

"bore the name of the security offered the victim," but which
defendant in fact owned or controlled (R. 461, see addendum A ) .
The magistrate also found that defendant deposited a $25,000
check from Dr. Nelson into the Cross County Management (CCM)
account over which he (defendant) had no signatory authority;
however, one of the CCM account signatories subsequently issued a
check for $25,000 to F.C. Finance, an account over which
defendant maintained sole control (R. 1157).

Thus, within a week

of depositing the $25,000 into the CCM account defendant regained
sole control of Dr. Nelson's money (R. 463, see addendum A ) .
Having made these deposits, defendant told each victim
that his money had been invested in a particular company and that
the money was not in his (defendant's) control (R. 463, see
addendum A ) .

The magistrate found that when asked, defendant

evaded and otherwise refused to answer the victims questions
regarding the location, nature and control of

their money (Id.).

Although some victims' actually received alleged interest
payments on their investments, these payments were received in
the form of cashiers' checks drawn on a bank and were not from
the company with which the victim had purportedly invested (Id.).
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Finally, the magistrate found that defendant personally withdrew
the proceeds and/or made multiple transfers of the proceeds
between his other controlled accounts and other entities (Id.).
The magistrate's findings provide "sufficient" support
for the money laundering charges in this case.

Pledger, 896 P.2d

at 1229-30. The reasonable inferences from the magistrate's
findings and bind over order on the securities act violations are
1) that defendant knew the monies he deposited were proceeds of
his fraudulent investment scam, and 2) that these deposits were
designed in whole or in part to conceal the ill-gotten proceeds
from the victims.

See Section 76-10-1903.

Ironically, the magistrate determined the opposite,
concluding that there was "no probable cause to establish that
defendant intentionally

concealed

the proceeds," based on a

perceived lack of evidence concerning "various transactions
between the defendant controlled accounts and other entities
after

the deposits of the physicians' proceeds into the

defendant-controlled accounts" (R. 465, see addendum A) (emphasis
added).

In so ruling, the magistrate effectively required proof

concerning the ultimate use of the proceeds which proof is simply
not an element of money laundering.

See Section 76-10-1903.

Contrary to the magistrate's reasoning, disguised
and/or concealed bank deposits constitute proof of concealment
for money laundering purposes--beyond even a reasonable doubt.
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See Reynolds, 64 F.3d at 297 (upholding Reynolds' conviction for
money laundering upon proof that he instructed his
secretary/codefendant to misdirect local UMWA dues to her
personal bank account and to alter financial records so that the
International UMWA would believe the local district's income from
dues was less that what it actually received); United States v.
Jackson. 935 F.2d 832, 842 (7th Cir. 1991) (upholding money
laundering conviction where defendant, a minister/drug dealer,
deposited his drug sale proceeds into church account, but treated
the funds as his own); United Stfrte? v, Holmes, 44 F.3d 1150,
1155-56 (2nd Cir. 1995) (affirming money laundering conviction
based on evidence that Holmes deposited embezzled Union funds
into his personal bank account and later withdrew some of it);
U.S. v. Posters N Things LTD. 969 F.2d 652, 661 (8th Cir. 1992)
(upholding money laundering conviction where defendant deposited
both legal and illegal proceeds into one bank account from which
she then made personal withdrawals), aff'd. 511 U.S. 513 (1994);
United States v. Sutera. 933 F.2d 641, 648 (8th Cir. 1991)
(upholding money laundering conviction where defendant deposited
illegal gambling proceeds into account named for his legitimate
restaurant business and caused checks to be drawn on the account
in the restaurant's name which he used to pay his personal bills
and gambling-related expenses).
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While the evidence in Jackson, Holmes, Posters N
Things. and Sutera established that those defendants also made
subsequent particular personal uses of the deposited illegal
proceeds, such evidence is not necessarily critical to the
establishment of an intent to conceal proceeds for purposes of a
money laundering conviction.

See, e.g.. Reynolds. 64 F.3d at 297

(upholding money laundering conviction based solely on evidence
that Union dues were criminally misdirected and deposited into
codefendants' personal bank account).
1903.

See also Section 76-10-

Rather, the emphasis in money laundering cases is on the

intent to conceal illegal proceeds.

Garcia-Emanual. 14 F.3d at

1476 (noting that federal money laundering statute is a
"concealment statute--not a spending statute").

Indeed, the

Sutera court emphasized that to successfully prosecute a money
laundering conviction,

necessitating proof beyond a reasonable

doubt, *[t]he jury simply ha[d] to find that Sutera intended to
hide

the gambling proceeds."

added).

Sutera. 933 P.2d at 648 (emphasis

See also Posters N Things, 969 F.2d at 661 (emphasizing

that a reasonable juror could infer an intent to disguise the
nature or source of unlawful proceeds where defendant
indistinguishably commingled in one account both legal and
illegal receipts).
Further, there is no requirement that a money
laundering defendant be particularly adroit in concealing illegal
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proceeds.

Sutera. 933 F.2d at 648 (noting that while Sutera

could have "better hidden" illegal gambling proceeds by •
commingling the funds with legitimate restaurant receipts, "the
money laundering statute [did] not require the jury to find that
Sutera [had done] a good job of laundering proceeds."); Jackson.
935 F.2d at 842 (fact that Jackson's "deception was ultimately
unsuccessful, and even that it was relatively easy for
investigators to pierce, does not mean that it falls beyond the
statute's reach").
Thus, an intent to conceal proceeds for purposes of the
money laundering statute is established when, as here, the
nature, location, ownership and or control of

those proceeds is

concealed and/or disguised by depositing them into shell
accounts.

It necessarily follows that such evidence will suffice

as probable cause for bind over purposes.

Pledger. 896 P.2d at

1230.
B.

Defendant'8
Transfers
of Proceeds Between His
Various Controlled
and Uncontrolled
Accounts
Supports Money Laundering
Charges

Even if evidence concerning defendant's ultimate use of
the proceeds is deemed critical evidence for bind over purposes,
sufficient indication of such was introduced below.
For example, the evidence established and the
magistrate found that the spreadsheets prepared by the State's
investigator reflected that defendant personally withdrew
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proceeds and also transferred proceeds between his controlled
accounts and other entities which he did not control (R. 461-64,
see addendum A) (see Supp. R. 1432-1540, Exh. ## 53-59A, 60-63A).
While the investigator's oral testimony could possibly have been
more detailed as to some of these transactions, the spreadsheets
provide abundant indication that such withdrawals and transfers
in fact occurred (Id.).

See United States v. Willey, 57 F.3d

1374, 1386 (5th Cir. 1995) (Mm]oving money through a large
number of accounts has, in the light of other evidence, also been
found to support the design element of [money laundering], even
when all the accounts to which the defendant transferred the
money and from which he withdrew it were in his own name."),
cert, denied, 116 S.Ct. 675 (1995).

To the extent the

magistrate's dismissal suggests that the State was required to
segregate transactions involving illegal proceeds from any
possibly legitimate transactions, such is not required by the
majority of federal courts considering the question.

See, e.g..

United States v. Johnson, 971 F.2d 563, 570 (10th Cir.
1992)(holding government not required to show that no legitimate
funds were deposited along with unlawful proceeds on the ground
that w[s]uch an interpretation would allow individuals to avoid
prosecution simply by commingling legitimate funds with proceeds
of crime," and thereby "defeat the very purpose of the moneylaundering statutes"); Garcia. 37 F.3d 1359, 1365 (9th Cir. 1994)
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(holding that "[i]t is unnecessary to attempt to segregate in
some manner the tainted funds from the commingled account.");
Jackson, 935 F.2d at 84 0 (holding that government is not required
to trace origin of all deposited sums in order to determine
exactly which funds were used for what transaction); United
States v. Bencs, 28 F.3d 555, 562 (6th Cir. 1994) (refusing to
read money laundering statute uin a manner that would reward the
more creative money-launderer by allowing him to escape liability
altogether by commingling assets or otherwise disguising the
source of his funds"), cert, denied,

U.S.

, 115 S.Ct. 915

(1995); United States v, Moore, 27 F.3d 969, 977 (4th Cir.)
("govenrment is not reqiured to prove that no 'untainted' funds
were involved, or that funds used in the transaction were
exclusively derived from the specified unlawful activity"), cert.
denied. 115 S.Ct. 459 (1994).

Cf. United States v. Heath. 970

F.2d 1397, 1404 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding that government need not
trace source of funds used in each individual transaction where
aggregate of funds transferred exceeded "untainted" money in
account), cert, denied gyb UQW, Cheng v. United States. 509 U.S.
1004 (1993); Willey. 57 F.3d at 1386 (holding that evidence that
defendant commingled proceeds with legitimate business was
sufficient to support money laundering charge).
Thus, remembering that the State's evidence is presumed
to strengthen by time of trial, the above evidence supports
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defendant's intent to conceal the proceeds for bind over
purposes.

Pledger. 896 P.2d at 1229-30.

It may be that evidence

regarding defendant's ultimate and precise use of the proceeds
will assist a jury to reach a guilty verdict in this case, but
such is not a required element of the money laundering statute.
See Section 76-10-1903.

Rather, all that is required is proof

that defendant intended to conceal his ill-gotten proceeds by
means of a financial transcation, in this case, by depositing the
proceeds into concealed bank accounts.
1902(2) (11) .

Id.: Section 76-10-

Accordingly, the magistrate erred as a matter of

law when it dismissed these charges based on its concerns about
the ultimate use of the proceeds.

Pledger. 896 P.2d at 1230.

The dismissal order should be overruled.
CONCLUSION
The order dismissing the pattern of unlawful activity
and money laundering charges should be reversed and the case
remanded for entry of an order binding defendant over for trial
on these charges, together with the 24 securities act violations
previously bound over.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this^L day of November, 1996.
JAN GRAHAM
Utah Attorney General
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IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.

GLENN EARL LLOYD, II,
Defendant.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND ORDER
Case No. 941020860
Judge Michael Hutchings

The above-entitled matter came on regularly for hearing on November 13-16,1995 and
January 3,1996 before the Honorable Michael Hutchings. The Defendant, Glenn Earl Lloyd II,
was present and represented by Gilbert Athay and Lonnie DeLand. The State of Utah was
represented by Robert K. Hunt. The Court, being folly advised in the premises, hereby enters its
findings of fact and conclusions of law as they pertain to counts 25 through 35 of the information

v \f «.' t: tf i

as follows1:

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The Court finds that, in order to bind over a charge under the Utah Pattern of Unlawful
Activity Act (Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1601, et. seq.), the State must demonstrate
probable cause that defendant engaged in at least three episodes of unlawful activity. The
Act specifically includes securities fraud as well as the sale of unregistered securities as
unlawful acts. (Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1602(1) and Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1602 (4)
(rrr)).

2.

In order to bind over a charge, the Court finds that the State must demonstrate probable
cause that defendant maintained, established, operated, conducted or participated in an
enterprise, which is defined as "a continuing unit for a common purpose of engaging in a
course of conduct." State v. McGrath 749 P.2d 631, 637 (Utah 1988) quoting from
United States v. Dickens 695 F.2d 765, 773 (3d Cir. 1982), cert Denied, 460 U.S. 1092
(1983). An enterprise is "any individual, sole proprietorship, partnership, corporation,
business trust, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals
associated in fact although not a legal entity, and includes illicit as well as licit entities."

1

By agreement between the parties and the court, these findings of facts and
conclusions of law address only the ten counts which were not bound over to District Court.
2
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Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1602(1). Because "the 'enterprise' is not the 'pattern of
racketeering activity'" the evidence must demonstrate probable cause that the enterprise
is "an entity separate and apartfromthe pattern of activity in which it engages." l i at
637.
The Court finds that, in order to bind over the defendant based on allegations of money
laundering, the State must present evidence that the defendant conducted a financial
transaction,
if, knowing that the property involved in afinancialtransaction represents proceeds of
some form of unlawful activity, he conducts or attempts to conduct afinancialtransaction
which in fact involves the proceeds of specified unlawful activity:
(b) knowing that the transaction is designed in whole or in part to:
(i)
conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the
ownership, or the control of the proceeds of specified unlawful activity.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1903 (1990). Securitiesfraudand the sale of unregistered
securities are "specified unlawful activities." (Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1902(9))
The uncontroverted facts presented at the preliminary hearing were as follows:
a.

During all times relevant to the charges presented (1991 through 1994), defendant
maintained an investment advisor business entitled Applied Financial Concepts
through which he gave investment advice, assisted individuals in investing their
money and transferred individuals' money to various investments.

b.

The defendant represented himself as an investment advisor to the following
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individuals: Dr. Stephen Bennett, Dr. Roger Sheffield, Dr. William Ellingson, Dr.
Elmo Gruwell, Dr. Ronald Saunders, Dr. Joseph Nelson, Dr. Paul Robinson, Dr.
Wendell Gadd and Dr. Alan Rappleye.
In his capacity as an investment advisor, defendant personally met with each of
the above-referenced individuals to discuss investing in one or more of the
following companies: F.C. Leasing, CC Management, Cross Country
Management, Peak Strategy Management, Sourceline Capital, AFC Inter-Cap,
Internal Capitalization Partnership, Tempus Utile, FC Finance, and AFC.
In each meeting, defendant described the above-referenced companies as existing,
viable companies doing business in the State of Utah.
The defendant told each physician that his investments were low risk and that his
principal would be returned in a period of one to three years and during that time
period, the physicians would receive monthly or quarterly interest payments,
ranging from eight to fourteen percent.
After the physicians were offered the securities, the physicians agreed to invest in
the described business and, in each instance, physically handed the defendant a
check issued to the specific business in which they had decided to invest.
The defendant opened the following checking accounts through the use of
registered and unregistered dbas: Sourceline Capital (Draper Bank ("Draper") #
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91-02679-9), FC Finance (First Security Bank ("FSB") # 216-26776-10), FC
Leasing (FSB # 216-25076-16), AFC (FSB # 216-26091-15), Peak Strategy
Management (FSB #216-1019290), Cross Country Management. (Bank One #
1162-8004), AFC Inter-Cap (Zions Bank # 015-352206), Tempus Utile (First
Interstate Bank # 26-03050-2), CC Management (FSB # 216-10192-82), and
Internal Capitalization Management (FSB # 216-00229-15). The defendant was
the sole signatory on these accounts and defendant was the only person who
deposited or withdrew money out of these accounts.
There were two Sourceline Capital accounts, one at Draper Bank and one at First
Security Bank. The Sourceline Capital account at Draper Bank listed Jerry
Sheets as a signatory and is not relevant to the State's money laundering charge.
However, the First Security Bank Sourceline Capital account (FSB #216-0001588) was established by the defendant and he was the sole signatory.
After the defendant personally received the victims' checks, he deposited the
checks into the above-referenced accounts which he owned and controlled.
These accounts bore the name of the security offered the victim so the money
could be deposited into that account. The deposits occurred as follows:
Dr. Sheffield's $10,000.00 to "Sourceline Capital" (FSB #216-00015-88)
Dr. Nelson's $40,394.00 to FC Finance (FSB # 216-26776-10)
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Dr, Rappleye"s $29,250, Dr. Saunders' $ $25,000.00, Dr. Ellingson's $20,000.00,
Dr. Bennett's $20,000.00, and Dr. Gadd's $15,000.00 to FC Leasing (FSB #21625076-16)

*

Dr. Rappleye's $ 10,000.00, Dr. Gruwell's $ 10,000.00, and Dr. Nelson's
$10,000.00 to AFC (FSB # 216-26091-15)

*

Dr. Nelson's $70,000.00 and Dr. Bennett's $20,625 to Peak Strategy
Management (FSB #216-1019290)

*

Dr. Nelson's $25,000.00 and Dr. Bennett's $ 10,000.00 to Cross Country
Management. (Bank One # 1162-8004)

*

Dr. Bennett's $20,000.00 and Dr. Saunders, $ 15,000.00 to AFC Inter-Cap (Zions
Bank #015-352206)

*

Dr Saunders' $25,000.00 to Tempus Utile (First Interstate Bank # 26-03050-2)

*

Dr. Nelson's $90,000.00 to CC Management (FSB # 216-10192-82)

*

Dr. Bennett's $15,000.00 and Dr. Gadd's $15,000.00 to Internal Capitalization
Management (FSB # 216-10192-82).

j.

Cross Country Management at Bank One listed Myron Lee Abbott and Edward C.
Parker as signatories. However, Dr. Nelson's $25,000.00 was the opening deposit
in that account on July 20,1993. On that same day, $10.00 cash was also placed
in the account. On July 27,1993, Myron Abbott issued a check for $25,000.00
from the Cross Country Account to FC Finance, an account over which the
defendant had sole control. Other than these three transactions, no other money
went in or out of the Cross Country Management account during the week of July
20 - 27,1993. Within one week, the defendant gained control over Dr. Nelson's
6
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$25,000.00, which Dr. Nelson was told would be invested in a business entitled
Cross Country Management.
k.

At all times relevant hereto, the defendant told the victims that their proceeds
were invested in the existing, viable, Utah companies which he initially offered
them and that the proceeds were not in his control. Defendant refused to answer
the physicians' questions regarding the proceeds' location, nature and control.

1.

Each time a victim actually received an alleged interest payment on his
investment, he would receive it in the form of a cashier's check drawn on a bank
and not from the alleged investment entity or even the defendant-controlled
account by the same name.

m.

After the physicians' funds were deposited into one or more of the defendantcontrolled accounts, the spreadsheets (Exhibits # 53A - 63A) established that the
following relevant activity occurred: 1) Funds would be withdrawn and deposited
in the various defendant-controlled accounts; 2) Funds would be withdrawn from
the defendant-controlled accounts and deposited into one or more of the
defendant's personal accounts; 3) Funds would be withdrawn from the
defendant-controlled accounts and transferred to other entities not controlled by
the defendant; or, 4) Funds would be deposited into the defendant-controlled
accounts from other entities not controlled by the defendant.
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n.

The spreadsheets from each defendant-controlled account (Exhibits 53A through
63A) established and explained the deposit and withdrawal activity which
occurred specifically between the ten defendant-controlled accounts as well as the
defendant's personal checking accounts.

o.

However, the State presented no testimony explaining the withdrawal and deposit
activity in the defendant-controlled accounts relating to entities not controlled or
established by the defendant such as Star King, Adalyn Financial, Capstone and
Towers, among others.

p.

Furthermore, the State's witness which testified as to the above-described
accounts could not tell the Court whether these defendant-controlled accounts
were interest bearing.

q.

During the time defendant was transferring these funds between his accounts and
to himself, he continued to maintain his investment advisor company, Applied
Financial Concepts, and continued to represent himself as an investment advisor.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1.

The Court concludes that since counts one through twenty four have been bound over to
District Court, probable cause exists to establish evidence of the pattern element required
under the Utah Pattern of Unlawful Activity Act.

2.

The Court concludes that, as a matter of law, there was no probable cause to suggest that
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defendant's use of his investment advisor business, Applied Financial Concepts, and his
use of various licit and illicit dbas in establishing the checking accounts wherein he
deposited the physicians' checks demonstrated the existence of an enterprise.
3.

The Court concludes that the evidence used to establish the existence of the investment
advisor company as well as the various dbas is evidence which only further establishes
and proves the elements of the pattern (the securitiesfraudand the sale of unregistered
securities), and not the existence of an enterprise.

4.

In reference to the ten money laundering counts, the Court concludes that there is no
probable cause to establish that the defendant intentionally concealed the proceeds since
no evidence was presented to answer the Court's questions as to the various transactions
which transpired between the defendant-controlled accounts and other entities after the
deposits of the physicians' proceeds into the defendant-controlled accounts.

DATED this

Michael Hutchings
Circuit Qourt Judge «v
* * 4
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THE COURT, having been fully advised in the premises,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1.

That counts one through twenty four of the criminal information be bound over to
District court.

2.

That counts twenty five through thirty five be dismissed.
DATED this Zip

day of

J^lU

, 1996

Michael Hutchings
Circuit Court Judge

Approved as to form:

Gilbert Athay
Attorney for the Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this ^ b day of^Xf /,UJ n A/t- s~
, 1996,1 caused a true
and correct copy of the foregoing "FINDINGS^F FACT Ahtf) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND ORDER" to be hand-delivered to the following:
Gilbert Athay, Esq.
Loni DeLand, Esq.
Attorneys for Defendant
43 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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ADDENDUM B

76-10-1603

CRIMINAL CODE

670 F. Supp. 920 CD. Utah 1987); State v.
McGrath, 749 P.2d 631 (Utah 1988).
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Child Sexual Abuse
Cases, 1986 Utah L. Rev. 443.

76-10-1603. Unlawful acts.
(1) It is unlawful for any person who has received any proceeds derived,
whether directly or indirectly,froma pattern of unlawful activity in which the
person has participated as a principal, to use or invest, directly or indirectly,
any part of that income, or the proceeds of the income, or the proceeds derived
from the investment or use of those proceeds, in the acquisition of any interest
in, or the establishment or operation of, any enterprise.
(2) It is unlawful for any person through a pattern of unlawful activity to
acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest in or control of any
enterprise.
(3) It is unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any
enterprise to conduct or participate, whether directly or indirectly, in the
conduct of that enterprise's affairs through a pattern of unlawful activity.
(4) It is unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any provision of
Subsection (1), (2), or (3).
History: C. 1953, i 76-10-1603, enacted
by L. 1987, ch. 238, $ 3.
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws
1987, ch. 238, § 3 repeals former § 76-10-1603,

as last amended by Laws 1985, ch. 234, § 3,
relating to unlawful acts and forfeitures, and
enacts the present section.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Conspiracy.
Elements.
Enterprise.
Pattern of unlawful activity.
Conspiracy.
Although conspiracy is one of the enumerated acts of racketeering under { 76-10-1602, it
is not a separate basis for recovery under this
•ection but is merely a crime that may qualify
as one of the predicate acts needed to show a
pattern of racketeering activity; standing
alone, a charge of conspiracy does not state a
cause of action under this section. Bache
Halsey Stuart Shields, Inc. v. Tracy Collins
Bank & Trust Co., 558 F. Supp. 1042 (D. Utah
1983).
Elements.
Both the "pattern of racketeering [unlawful]
activity" and "enterprise* elements must be
established to convict under this section. State
v. McGrath, 749 P.2d 631 (Utah 1988).
In dismissing plaintiffs' pattern of unlawful
Activity claim, it was error for the trial court to

rule that "plaintiffs did not prove the existence
of three similar instances of unlawful activity
that involve separate and different entities"
because the act does not require three separate
entities and, furthermore, the existence of one
enterprise is sufficient to invoke liability under
the act. Alta Indus. Ltd. v. Hurst, 846 P.2d 1282
(Utah 1993).
Enterprise.
Evidence established the existence of an "enterprise," where defendant and another had an
ongoing association for the purpose of making
money from the sale of controlled substances,
and the two men functioned as a continuing
unit for a common purpose of engaging in a
course of conduct. State v. McGrath, 749 P.2d
631 (Utah 1988).
Indictment and bill of particulars did not
sufficiently describe factual basis for element of
enterprise to enable defendant to prepare adequate defense. State v. Bell, 770 P.2d 100
(Utah 1988).
P a t t e r n of unlawful activity.
A pattern of racketeering activity requires
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NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
El P E nts ^
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Culpability.
This section requires the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant either
knew of the falsity, or had a reckless disregard
for the truth, of any "pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions" made by
the defendant Former Subsection (7), making
absence of knowledge or recklessness an affirmative defense, merely emphasized that absent
either of these mental states, a conviction for

communications fraud is improper. State v.
Tebbs, 786 P.2d 775 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
* ^ B s e c t * 0 D **** n e v c r Placed upon defendant
the burden to prove the absence of criminal
intent on his part. See State v. Tebbs, 786 P.2d
775 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
Elements.
A required element of the crime of communications fraud is that the object of the fraud be
proven. State v. Becker, 803 P.2d 1290 (Utah Ct.
App. 1990).
Cited in State v. LeFevre, 825 P.2d 681 (Utah
Ct. App. 1992).

PART 19
MONEY LAUNDERING AND CURRENCY TRANSACTION
REPORTING
76-10.1901. Short title.
This part is known as the Money Laundering and Currency Transaction
Reporting Act.
History: C. 1953, 76-10-1901, enacted by
L. 1989, ch. 241, 5 1.

76-10-1902. Definitions.
As used in this part:
(1) "Bank* means each agent, agency, or office in this state of any person
doing business in any one of the following capacities:
(a) a commercial bank or trust company organized under the laws
of this state or of the United States;
(b) a private bank;
(c) a savings and loan association or a building and loan association
organized under the laws of this state or of the United States;
(d) an insured institution as defined in Section 401 of the National
Housing Act;
(e) a savings bank, industrial bank, or other thrift institution;
(f) a credit union organized under the laws of this state or of the
United States; or
(g) any other organization chartered under Title 7 and subject to
the supervisory authority set forth in that title.
(2) "Conducts" includes initiating, concluding, or participating in initiating or concluding a transaction.
(3) (a) "Currency" means the coin and paper money of the United
States or of any other country that is designated as legal tender, that
circulates, and is customarily used and accepted as a medium of
exchange in the country of issuance.
471

76-10-1902

CRIMINAL CODE

(b) "Currency" includes United States silver certificates, United
States notes, Federal Reserve notes, and foreign bank notes customarily used and accepted as a medium of exchange in a foreign country.
(4) "Financial institution" means any agent, agency, branch, or office
within this state of any person doing business, whether or not on a regular
basis or as an organized business concern, in one or more of the following
capacities:
(a) a bank, except bank credit card systems;
(b) a broker or dealer in securities;
(c) a currency dealer or exchanger, including a person engaged in
the business of check cashing;
(d) an issuer, seller, or redeemer of travelers checks or money
orders, except as a selling agent exclusively who does not sell more
than $150,000 of the instruments within any 30-day period;
(e) a licensed transmitter of funds or other person engaged in the
business of transmitting funds;
(f) a telegraph company;
(g) a person subject to supervision by any state or federal supervisory authority; or
(h) the United States Postal Service regarding the sale of money
orders.
(5) "Financial transaction" means a transaction:
(a) involving the movement of funds by wire or other means or
involving one or more monetary instruments, which in any way or
degree affects commerce; or
(b) involving the use of a financial institution that is engaged in, or
its activities affect commerce in any way or degree.
(6) The phrase "knowing that the property involved in a financial
transaction represents the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity"
means that the person knows the property involved in the transaction
represents proceeds from a form, though he does not necessarily know
which form, of activity that constitutes a felony under state or federal law,
regardless of whether or not the activity is specified in Subsection (9).
(7) "Monetary instruments" means coins or currency of the United
States or of any other country, travelers checks, personal checks, bank
checks, money orders, and investment securities or negotiable instruments in bearer form or in other form so that title passes upon delivery.
(8) "Person" means an individual, corporation, partnership, trust or
estate, joint stock company, association, syndicate, joint venture, or other
unincorporated organization or group, and all other entities cognizable as
legal personalities.
(9) "Prosecuting agency" means the office of the attorney general or the
office of the county attorney, including any attorney on the staff whether
acting in a civil or criminal capacity.
(10) "Specified unlawful activity" means any unlawful activity defined
as an unlawful activity in Section 76-10-1602, except Subsection (4Xaaaa),
and includes activity committed outside this 6tate which, if committed
within this state, would be unlawful activity.
(11) "Transaction" means a purchase, sale, loan, pledge, gift, transfer,
delivery, or other disposition. With respect to a financial institution,
"transaction" includes a deposit, withdrawal, transfer between accounts,
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exchange of currency, loan, extension of credit, purchase or sale of any
stock, bond, certificate of deposit, or other monetary instrument, or any
other payment, transfer, or delivery by, through, or to afinancialinstitution, by whatever means effected.
(12) "Transaction in currency means a transaction involving the physical transfer of currencyfromone person to another. A transaction that is
a transfer of funds by means of bank check, bank draft, wire transfer, or
other written order that does not include the physical transfer of currency
is not a transaction in currency under this chapter
History: C. 1953, 76-10-1902, enacted by
L. 1989, ch. 241, § 2; 1993, ch. 80, S 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1993 amendxnent, effective May 3,1993, added Subsections
(1), (4), and (9), deleted former Subsections (7)
and (8), which defined "reporting institution"
and "reporting person," and redesignated the
remaining subsections accordingly and, in Subsection (10) substituted "defined as an unlawful activity* for "as defined" near the beginning
and added all of the language beginning with
•except" at the end.

Federal Law. — Section 401 of the National
Housing Act, cited in Subsection dXd), was 12
U.S.C. $ 1724. It was repealed in 1989, along
with the rest of Subchapter IV of the Act,
Insurance of Savings and Loan Accounts,
Compiler's Notes. — The reference in Subg ^ o n ( 6 ) to Subsection (9) should now cite
Subsection (10), which specifies unlawful activi t y Bnd w h i c h w a s ^designated from (9) to (10)
b y ihe 1 9 9 3 amendment,

76-10-1903. Money laundering by financial transaction —
Elements — Penalty.
(1) A person commits the offense of money laundering byfinancialtransaction if, knowing that the property involved in afinancialtransaction represents proceeds of some form of unlawful activity, he conducts or attempts to
conduct afinancialtransaction which in fact involves the proceeds of specified
unlawful activity:
(a) with intent to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful activity;
or
(b) knowing that the transaction is designed in whole or in part to:
(i) conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the
ownership, or the control of the proceeds of specified unlawful activity;
or
(ii) avoid a transaction reporting requirement under this chapter.
(2) Money laundering byfinancialtransaction is a second degree felony.
History: C. 1953, 76-10-1903, enacted by
L. 1989, ch. 241,ft3.

76-10-1904. Money laundering by transportation — Elements — Penalty.
(1) A person commits the offense of money laundering by transportation if
he transports or attempts to transport a monetary instrument or funds:
(a) with the intent to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful
activity; or
(b) knowing that the monetary instrument or funds involved in the
transportation represent the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity
and knowing that the transportation is designed in whole or in part to:
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